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Abstract
This study aims to investigate the relationship between Board of Director characteristics and
CEO compensation. This is semi-empirical study and statistical sample of research was based on
95 companies listed on the Tehran stock exchange from 2010 to 2014. Variables examined
include the ratio of non-executive board members, CEO duality, ownership of institutional
shareholders and managerial ownership as independent variables. Factors influencing CEO
compensation were considered and the relationship between these variables was studied using
multivariate regression. The findings indicate that there is a negative relationship between CEO
compensation and managerial ownership. There is also a significant positive relationship
between CEO compensation and CEO duality. However, there was no evidence for a significant
relationship between ratios of non-executive board members and CEO compensation.
JEL Classification: G34
Keywords: CEO compensation, ratio of non-executive board members, CEO duality, ownership,
institutional investors, managerial ownership.
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1. Introduction
During two last decades, CEO compensation has been studied by academics, the public, policy
makers and investors in terms of corporate governance mechanisms. Empirical evidence
indicates that the compensation of executives during previous years has not only increased
considerably but also that this compensation is paid through different methods such as cash,
shares and other stock options (Core, 2003). Granting stock or stock options as compensation for
executives provides opportunities for competition among managers of the firm for increasing
income and preserving cash without extra costs or exiting cash (Denis, 2001). For the
compensation of executives, there is a concern that managers could be involved in manipulating
internal transactions of companies that increase compensation. Managers are aware of
compensation and evaluation of performance by stockholders and regarding this, they may
intend to manipulate earnings. The board of directors is a guiding institution which has the
control and monitoring role in order to improve the performance of the company and to preserve
the interests of stockholders. One motivation for increasing efficiency, improving performance
and preserving interests of stockholders is paying compensation to board of directors. In fact, the
board of directors is an integral part of the company. Corporate governance is a set of procedures
or actions by which companies are run and respond to stockholders, employees and society. The
purpose of corporate governance is to ensure that activities of company and policies of
management are in line with the interests of stockholders, in particular, and all beneficiaries,
generally (Rajabi & Ganji, 2010). Agency theory assumes that there is potential conflict between
the interests of stockholders and management and that managers seek to maximize their profit
although these interests are in conflict with interests of stockholders (Micchal & Rui, 2002).
Agency relationship, as an interaction between one or more stockholders or owners and one or
more agents, that agents accept the responsibility for providing some services (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). Generally, management compensation is the main solution for agency
problems. Based on this belief, by establishing a suitable model for paying compensation,
managers will act on behalf of stockholders and creditors. The main reason for compensation is
that managers should be compensated for their organizational responsibilities and develop the
required motivation to carry them out in the stockholders’ interests. Therefore, this research tries
to find empirical evidence to answer the questions: “is there any significant relationship between
corporate governance mechanisms and the compensation of managers in firms listed on the
Tehran stock exchange? What is this relationship?”.
2. Literature review and hypotheses development
Corporate governance is subject of many discussions in the business world and financial markets
during last ten years such that development of corporate governance mechanism as a priority for
developing suitable leadership procedures is considered by financial and economic policy
makers. The basic problem in this monitoring mechanism occurs when stockholders oppose the
activities of managers. What is now considered to be “hidden” activities of companies in
scientific and professional circles, is an exploration of control mechanism of firms which is
presented in corporate governance literature (Zamani, 2010). There are different definitions of
corporate governance, including limited and focused definitions of companies and stockholders
to comprehensive definitions and responding to stockholders, individuals or beneficiaries. One
comprehensive definition is:
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“corporate governance is a set of systems, processes and structures which seeks to ensure equity,
accountability, transparency and justice in business by using internal mechanisms like board of
directors, internal administrative control and auditing, internal auditing, risk management and
external mechanisms like regulatory monitoring, legal systems, capital market, monitoring of
major stockholders, independent auditing and ranking institutions” (Rahmani, 2010). Generally,
corporate governance is a multidisciplinary concept and aims to achieve four principles in the
firms:
1- Accountability 2-Transparency 3-Justce (fairness) 4-Observing rights of equity holders.
The Board of directors is an important corporate governance mechanism and plays important
role in improving quality of financial reporting and reducing fraud. Based on the general
definition, corporate governance is a system by which companies are guided and controlled.
Here, position of board of directors as a guiding body which has monitoring role for executives,
is more important.
Managers, by considering their personal interests, focus and invest in projects which have short
term interests and pay no attention to the long term interests of stockholders (especially, in cases
where salaries, benefits and compensation of managers are related to financial profit). In large
companies controlled directly by managers and indirectly by institutional investors, managers are
constrained to an interest in short term earnings. Under these conditions, managers are motivated
to gain other earnings which reduces the value of stockholders’ interests (Hasas Yeganeh, 2005).
In other words, by increasing conflict between managers and stockholders of joint stock
companies, those managers who seek the growth of the company at the expense of stockholders’
interests, tend to make unprofitable (short term focused) investments in order to increase their
salaries. This will lead to agency costs and finally, reduces the wealth of stockholders.
In order to compensate the creativity and initiatives of management in finding and applying
procedures and new work methods, organizations often give rewards to management.
Compensation is often paid for doing responsibilities at a higher level than common standards. In
sum, we can say that managers are aware of their compensation and performance appraisal by
stockholders and, for this purpose, they manipulate earnings to achieve compensation. If CEO
compensation was lower than a given (desired) level, management transfers part of future years'
earnings to the current period and, in some cases, management transfers current year earnings to
future years. Fama (2010) discusses compensation and the role of accounting selections in CEO
compensation. Managers, in addition to their salaries, enjoy continuously extra compensation
based on their performance. Data from financial statements, especially net profit, are used to
measure the performance of managers. Therefore, managers have motivation for selecting
accounting methods and authorizing accounting estimates and methods that improve their
compensation. Researchers have interpreted this issue as managers, providing that their
compensation is determined based on the profit, have motivation for selecting accounting
methods that increase earnings. Fama (2010) concluded that managers, in the case of
determining bottom or ceiling in compensation plans, select accruals that reduce earning and
when there is no bottom or ceiling, they select accruals that increase earnings. When
stockholders of a company delegate decision making to management, managers have motivations
for activities that maximize their interests, even if these activities were not in line with the
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interests of stockholders. Earning management occurs when managers change financial reporting
and the structure of transactions in order to misguide some beneficiaries (stockholders, creditors,
employees, investors) about the performance of the firm, or even influencethe results of contracts
which are dependent on the accounting figures. In fact, earning management is a deliberate act in
order to pretend that the earnings of the company has naturally reached the (manager’s) desired
level. Among motivations for this act, we can refer to the influence of earning management on
stock price, increases in salary and management advantages and prevention of violating loan
contracts. Most of these motivations are related to the future interests like compensation.
2.1. Corporate governance in Iran
Corporate governance in Iran is not yet well developed, but in the last few decades the
government has taken some steps to make marginal improvements. The Tehran Stock Exchange
(TSE) was established in early 1967. The process of instituting and controlling firms is briefly
addressed in the Iranian Trade Law, particularly in its April 1968 amendment. A modem concept
of corporate governance was not recognized in Iran, however, until the government sought to
improve the competitive position of Iranian companies in the world’s capital markets in an
attempt to attract foreign investment. In early 2000, the management of the TSE, the Islamic
Parliament Research Center and the Economic and Finance Ministry, began efforts to improve at
least on paper, corporate governance in Iran. Until recently, the Iranian government controlled
the majority of businesses in Iran, either directly or indirectly, and has made significant efforts to
expand the capital market. Its actions indicate an interest in enhancing the current system to
include external governance structures. For instance, the Third and the Fourth Economic
Development Plans place a great deal of importance on the privatization of governmental
organizations. Recent policies have also been aimed at increasing the number of external control
mechanisms in place. Currently, Iranian firms still have weak internal and external corporate
governance when compared to companies in industrialized nations. The capital market in Iran is
new and somewhat inefficient. Pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance companies now own
more than half of the share value of publicly traded stocks on the TSE. Major shareholders,
including institutional investors, exercise their supervision by controlling management decisions
and by appointing executives according to their whims and fancies. Unlike that of majority
shareholders, minority shareholders’ interests are not protected in contrast to other countries
where non-controlling shareholders sometimes exercise significant influence. No Iranian
institution ranks firms based on such characteristics as revenue, income, total assets, number of
employees, etc. Iran’s internal control supervision mechanisms are also inadequate. In general,
organizational roles and responsibilities are poorly defined and communicated. As a result,
employees too often place personal gain and interest ahead of corporate interest. Nevertheless,
and despite the noted inefficiencies, public companies registered on the TSE are required to have
their financial statements reviewed by an external auditor. In late 2004, the TSE Research and
Development Center published the first edition of The Iranian Code of Corporate Governance.
This code consisted of 22 clauses, which included the following: definitions of key terminology,
an overview of the management board and shareholders’ responsibilities, guidelines for financial
disclosures, and a conceptual framework for accountability and auditing. The code was amended
in 2005 to address issues of ownership structure, the capital market situation and the Trade Law.
This second edition of The Iranian Code of Corporate Governance contains five chapters and 38
clauses. While the application of this code is not mandatory, many firms have implemented it.
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2.2. Hypotheses Development
2.2.1- Board independence and CEO compensation
Agency scholars (Byard, Y. Li, J. Weintrop. (2006) suggest that appointing outside directors on
the board is an important aspect that enhances the board’s independency and, as a result,
increases its directors’ ability and willingness to monitor management’s investing and financing
decisions. Generally, empirical studies provide support for the hypothesis that the percentage of
outsiders on the board has a positive effect on firm performance.board with a high proportion of
insiders is regarded to be a weak governance mechanism. Others report that boards with a low
proportion of outside directors pay their CEOs higher compensation. Both Coakley and
Iliopoulou (2006) and Talmor and Wallace (2000) argue that board strength and effectiveness act
as a substitute to incentive compensation. Arguably, stronger boards are related to lower CEO
compensation. On the contrary, Core et al. (1999) report that the high proportion of insiders on
boards are negatively associated with CEO compensation. Similarly, Hermalin and Weisbach
(1991) report that outside directors are less effective in monitoring CEO compensation. Ozkan
(2007, 2011) reports that the proportion of non-executive directors on a board hasa positive
relationship with CEO compensation, which suggests that non-executive directors are not an
effective monitoring mechanism for determining CEO compensation.Based on the foregoing
discussion it can be inferred that the proportion of outside directors might have an inverse impact
on CEO compensation, thus we posit the following hypothesis (in alternate) form:
H1:Proportion of non-executive/independent directors will be a negative effect on CEOs’
compensation.
2.2.2- CEO Duality and CEO compensation
Fama and Jensen (1983) point out that CEO duality signals the absence of separation of decision
control and decision management. The result of CEO duality is the concentration of decisionmaking power, which could constrain board independence and reduce its ability to execute its
oversight and governance roles (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). CEOs on boards mean that they
have greater power and are more influential and therefore are able to increase their compensation
packages. This is more of a case when the CEO is also the chairperson, or when the CEO is a
member of the compensation/remuneration committee. Core et al. (1999) and Reddy et.al (2015)
report that CEO compensation is much higher when the CEO is also the chairperson of the
board. Based on the above, we propose our second hypotheses as follows:
H2:CEOs on boards will have a positive effect on CEOs’ compensation.
2.2.3- Managerial ownershipand CEO compensation
One important form of insider ownership in the firms is managerial ownership. Managerial
ownership can increase management´s motivation to work to raise the value of the firm´s stock
(Hermalin & Weissbach 1991). Yermack (1996) reports that board stock ownership and firm
value are positively associated. Therefore, it is assumed that by providing managerial ownership
incentivesmay align management’s interest closely with that of the shareholders, thus
encouraging them to consume fewer perquisites and provide vigilance so that large shareholders
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do not expropriate outside small shareholders’ interests. Based on the prior literature, we propose
our fourth hypothesis as follows:
H3:Managerial ownership will be negatively associated with CEOs’ compensation levels.
3.1. Background research
Steven et.al (2005) studied the relationship between characteristics of board of directors and
compensation of executives in private sector. Research sample includes 80 companies listed in
Tehran stock exchange in New Zealand. Results of research show that there is significant
relationship between all variables with compensation of board, except non-executive members'
variable.
Ozkan (2007) in a research titled "corporate governance and CEO compensation in UK
companies" studied the performance of companies and effect of corporate governance
mechanisms and ownership structure and structure of board in determining amount of
compensation for managing director. Research sample included 414 large UK companies during
2003-204. Results of research show that firms with larger size and higher ratio of non-executive
members have higher compensation.
Dong and Ozkan (2008) studied determinants in compensation paid to managers by emphasis on
the modifying effect of institutional ownership. Research sample included 563 non-financial
companies during 2000-2004. Results showed that ownership of institutional investors enhances
the relationship between performance and compensation of managers.
Conyon and He (2011) studied the relationship between executives' compensation and corporate
governance mechanisms in Chinese companies. In this research, log of compensation was used
as dependent variable and institutional ownership, non-executive managers, size of board and
dichotomy of managing director as independent variables of research and measures of corporate
governance. Findings showed that company with non-executive managers and higher
institutional ownership, pay lower compensation to managers.
Erkens et.al (2012) studied the effect of corporate governance on the financial performances of
companies during crisis 200-2008. This study has used date of 296 financial companies from 30
countries in the center of crisis. They used variables independence of board, institutional
ownership and major stockholders as criteria for measuring corporate governance. Findings of
research indicated that firms with more independent board and higher institutional ownership
during crisis experience lower return and higher loss. Reddy et.al (2015) in a research titled
"effect of corporate governance on the executives' managers in firms listed in New Zealand stock
exchange" by using sample consisted of 490 firm-year observation during 2005 to 2010, studied
the relationship between these variables in capital market of New Zealand. They used variables
non-executive members, CEO duality, managerial ownership and institutional investors'
ownership as corporate governance measures. By using multivariate regression models, results of
hypothesis testing indicates that compensation of managers has negative significant relationship
with ratio of non-executive managers, ownership of institutional investors and managerial
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ownership and positive significant relationship with dichotomy of
responsibility.

managing director'

Javan Balenga (2012) studied the effect of ownership structure on the relationship of executive'
compensation and performance. Findings of this research indicated that ownership focus has
positive and significant effect of the relationship between compensation of board members and
performance of firms. While in corporate ownership, the focus has positive and significant effect
on the relationship between compensation of board and return of stocks, but there is no
relationship in managerial ownership.
Ebrati (2013) studies the relationship between corporate governance index and performance and
whether competition of product market can be an alternative governance mechanisms or
supplementary of corporate governance. In order to test hypothesis, a sample consisted of 178
firms listed in Tehran stock exchange during 2008-2011. Research variables included corporate
governance which is determined based on the ranking of firms based on the governing factors.
Hierfeindal-Hirschman index is used for market competition and performance criteria Q-Tobin,
assets return and efficiency. Results of research showed that product market competition can
supplement corporate governance and improves the performance by corporate governance.
3. Research Methodology
This research is applied in terms of purpose and post event semi-empirical in terms of data
acquisition in accounting research which has been conducted by using multivariate regression
and econometrics models. Statistical sample of this research includes all firms listed in Tehran
stock exchange during 2010-2014. Selected sample includes firms with following characteristics:
1. Firms listed in stock exchange organization before 2010 and are in this list until end of 2014.
2. In order to increase comparability, fiscal year is March.
3. They have not changed their activity or fiscal year.
4. They should not be investment or broker companies.
5. Lag in the transactions of these firms should not exceed 6 months.
After above limitations, 95 firms were selected as statistical sample in this research. Data were
extracted from statistical archive CDs of Tehran stock exchange, database of Tehran stock
exchange and other related databases and software Tadbirpardaz and Dena. Final analysis of data
was done with Eviews.
1.3. Variables and used models
Study variables in this research include dependent variable, independent variables and control
variables.
1.1.3. dependent variable
Dependent variable in this research is executives' compensation which is calculated through
compensation of board to loss or gain of company.
2.1.3. independent variables
• Ratio of non-executive board members
It is calculated by dividing number of non-executive members of board on total number of
board. By non-executive members, we mean a member who has not executive position in firm.
• CEO duality
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This is a virtual variable that its value is 1 if managing director is president and vice-president of
board; otherwise, it is 0.
• Managerial ownership
Managerial ownership is sum of shares possessed by members of board.
3.1.3. control variables
In this research, some of important variables which are known as effective factors based on the
effective factors on executive' compensation, were considered as control variables, including:
• Firm size:
In this research, similar to Alves et.al (2012), natural log of firms' annual sale was used for
measuring size of firm.
• Firms value:
According to Reddi et.al (2015) and Conyonet,al (2011) research, Q-Tobin was used in this
study in order to measure the value of company that this ratio is calculated by dividing market
value to asset substitution value. Value larger than 1 indicate optimal use of assets. Because it is
difficult to estimate the market value of debt and asset replacement, simplified model was used
for calculating Q-Tobin:
ܳ,௧ = ൫ܣܸܤ,௧ + ܧܸܯ,௧ − ܧܸܤ,௧ ൯ൗܣܸܤ,௧
In which
ܳ,௧ is Q-Tobin for firm i in year t, BVAi,t is book value of assets for firm i in year t, MVEi,t is
market value of equity holders firm i in year t and BVEi,t is book value of equity holders of firm
i in year t.
In order to test hypotheses, we used model of Reddi et.al (2015) as following:
ܲܯܱܥ,௧ = ߚ + ߚଵ ܦܰܫ,௧ + ߚଶ ܮܣܷܦ,௧ + ߚଷ ܰܣܯ,௧ + ߚସ ܵܧܼܫ,௧ + ߚହ ܳ,௧ + ߝ,௧
COMPi,t: ratio of executives' compensation to loss and gain of firm i in year t;
INDi,t: ratio of non-executive board members of firm i in year t;
DUALi,t: CEO duality of firm i in year t;
MANi,t: managerial ownership in firm i in year t;
SIZEi,t: size of firm equals with log of sale for firm i in year t;
Qi,t: calculated value of firm based on the Q-Tobin for firm i in year t;
εi,t: regression model error;
in order to estimate research model, we used pooled data method. Pooled data is obtained by
combining time-series and cross-sectional data which is now widely used by researchers. In most
cases, researchers use this method for cases where problems cannot be studied as time-series or
cross-sectional or when data is low. Merging time-series and cross-sectional data and necessity
of using it is due to increase in number of observations, higher degree of freedom, low
heteroscadisticity and reducing colinearity between variables.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
In order to study general characteristics of variables and estimating the model and careful
analysis, familiarity of descriptive data is necessary. Table (1) is descriptive data of variables
which includes central tendency and dispersion indices for a sample consisted of 95 firms-year
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observations during 2010-2014. Comparison of observations' mean with median and their slight
differences shows the normality of data distribution.

Table (1): descriptive data for research variables
Variable
Observations Mean
Median
Min
Max
SD
COMP
95
0.014
0.011
0.000
0.062
0.103
IND
95
0.661
0.637
0.2
0.714
0.351
DUAL
95
0.168
0
0
1
0.283
MAN
95
0.098
0.086
0.001
0.439
0.608
SIZE
95
11.503
11.108
10.647
12.703
0.732
Q
95
1.623
1.409
0.864
5.309
1.237
COMP: ratio of board compensation to loss and gain, IND: ratio of non-executive members;
DUAL: CEO duality; MAN: managerial ownership of company; SIZE: size of company; Q:
value of firm based on Q-Tobin.
As this table shows, non-executive managers form %66 of board of directors in this study. In
addition, ownership of institutional investors in sample companies fluctuates from 0 to 96% and
its mean for these companies is %58 which indicates active participation of these investors in
stock exchange. Size of company which is calculated by log of annual sale has mean 11.503 and
median 11.108 that it's minimum and maximum is 10.647 and 12.703.
5.2.Multivariate hypothesis test
Regarding pooled data modelling, we first should specify which assumption should be imposed
by assuming the same or different intercepts for different cross-section. Therefore, we have used
Limer F-test. In this test, H0 hypothesis indicates same intercept and hypothesis H1indicates
inhomogeneity of intercepts. If F-statistics was larger than critical F-value, null hypothesis is
rejected and different intercepts are accepted for cross-sections. Results show that null
hypothesis is rejected in different cross-sections. After specifying that intercept is not same for
different cross-sections, we should determine used method for estimating model which is
Hussmann test. In this test, hypothesis H0 indicates consistency of estimating random effect
against H1, indicates inconsistency of random effect estimations. Therefore, if H0 is accepted,
random effect method is preferred to constant effects; otherwise, constant effects will be
preferred to random effects' model. Results of table (2) indicate that null hypothesis is accepted;
therefore, model should be estimated by random effects' method.
Table (2): results of tests for estimating research model
Test
Statistic value
Degree of freedom
Sig.
Result
F-Limer test
6.083
(374,94)
0.000
H0 rejected
Hussmann test
10.535
6
0.092
H0 accepted
In this research, for correlation test between residuals, Durbin-Watson statistics and for
heteroskedasticity, generalized least squares (GLS) will be used. In addition, in order to measure
collinearity test was studied using variance inflation factor and tolerance. Generally, this problem
occurs when variance inflation factor for exploratory variables is more than 10 or its tolerance is
near 0. By looking F-statistics (9.621) in this table and comparing it F table, we can see that
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fitted regression model is significant in %5 level error. Adjusted determination coefficient
indicates that independent variables explain about %56 of executive' compensation changes.
Durbin-Watson statistics (2.081) indicates lack of auto-correlation between components of
regression model. The reason for this is that Durbin-Watson statistics intends to 2. Regarding
significance and suitability of fitted regression model, we can analyze research hypotheses as
following:
Table (3): results of research hypotheses
Variables
Coefficients Standard
t-statistics
Sig.
Collineraity statistics
error
VIF
Tolerance
0.385
C
-0.004
IND
0.054
DUAL
-0.006
MAN
0.025
SIZE
0.041
Q
9.621
F statistics
0.559
Adjusted R2
Model estimation method

0.170
0.010
0.018
0.002
0.008
0.020

2.257
0.0247
-0.404
0.6859
1.208
2.891
0.0041
1.192
-2.567
0.0107
1.203
3.005
0.0011
1.148
2.003
0.0460
1.172
F significance
0.000
Durbin-Watson statistics
2.081
Constant effects

0.827
0.837
0.831
0.831
0.853

The First hypothesis indicates that there is significant relationship between non-executive board
members and executives' compensation in firms. As above table shows estimated coefficient and
t-statistics related to non-executive board members (IND) is negative but it is not statistically
significant. Based on this, H0 hypothesis is accepted and first research hypothesis is rejected in
%5 level error.
The second hypothesis indicates that there is significant relationship between CEO duality and
executives' compensation. As table (3) shows, estimated coefficient and t-statistics related to
DUAL is positive and significant in %5 error level. Therefore, H0 hypothesis is rejected and the
second hypothesis is confirmed in %5 error level.
The fourth hypothesis states that there is a significant relationship between managerial ownership
and executives' compensation. As table shows, estimated coefficient and t-statistics related to
managerial ownership is negative and significant in %5 error level. Therefore, H0 is rejected and
fourth hypothesis is confirmed in %95 confidence level. Among control variables of model, only
firm size variables and leverage have significant relationship with value of company.
6. Conclusion
The purpose of this research was studying the relationship between corporate governance and
executives' compensation. In order to achieve this, a sample consisted of 95 firms listed in
Tehran stock exchange during 2010-2014 is considered.
In first hypothesis, the relationship between non-executive members' ratio and CEOs’
compensation was tested. Result of hypothesis testing indicates lack of significant relationship
between non-executive members and CEOs’ compensation. This is while based on the
theoretical basics and agency theory, it is expected that presence of non-executive managers in
boards and monitoring performance as independent individuals reduces compensation of
managers due to information asymmetry between managers and owners and agency issues.
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The results of second hypothesis indicated that there is positive significant relationship between
CEO duality and executives' compensation. This means that in firms that duties of head of board
of directors is not separated from managing director, due to disturbance in monitoring role and
independence of board, the motivation for personal interest and compensation increases. This
result is consistent with findings of Reddi et.al (2015).
In the fourth hypothesis, we studied the relationship between managerial ownership and CEOs’
compensation. Result of hypothesis testing indicates that there is negative and significant
relationship between managerial ownership and executives' compensation. This finding is
consistent with results of Reddi et.al (2015) research. It is suggested to investors and activists of
capital market that during investment decision-making, they consider structure of board as an
effective factor on executives' compensation in their decision making models.
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